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In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, communities across England used 
country bankers’ notes almost as much as they used coins and Bank of England notes. 
Accounting for the relative success of these alternative currencies is challenging, 
however, due to the frequency of financial crisis during the period. If, during a crisis, 
all note holders attempted to enforce the promise to pay in gold coin against the issuing 
banker, the “law-finance paradox” would leave some note holders with gold coin, but 
would leave many more with merely “country rags” or worthless pieces of paper. 
Building on both the credit approach to money and the relational approach to contract, 
this article shows note using communities successfully responding to financial crisis. 
They frequently did so by formalising the bonds of reciprocity and trust tying the 






In 1801, a Mr Grigsby presented for payment in gold coin one of the notes issued by a 
country banker, Oakes & Co., in Bury St Edmunds. The banker refused to pay. Grigsby 
responded to the banker’s refusal by taking the matter to court.1 Both at the local level and on 
appeal, the court sided with Grigsby and insisted the banker honour his promise by 
converting the note into gold coin. Yet despite siding with Grigsby, the judgment of the 
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1 Grigsby v. Oakes (1801) 126 ER 1420. See also L. S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution 
(1956) at 156; F. W. Fetter, ‘Legal Tender During the English and Irish Bank Restrictions’ (1950) 58(3) J. of 
Political Economy 241, at 242-3; and J. K. Horsefield, ‘The Duties of a Banker-II. The Effects of 
Inconvertibility’ (May, 1944) 11 Economica 74, at 76. In 1797, owing to the commencement of hostilities with 
France, parliament suspended the obligation requiring the Bank of England to convert its notes into gold coin on 
demand by enacting the Restriction on Cash Payments Act 1797 (37 Geo. III c. 45). Left unclear by the 
legislation freeing the Bank of England from this obligation was whether it also applied to country bankers such 
as Oakes & Co. It was against this legislative background that Grigsby presented the note for payment. On the 
suspension of convertibility, and its resumption in 1819, see J. Clapham, The Bank of England: A History (1944) 




appeal court was not entirely sympathetic. By demanding gold coin, Grigsby only added to 
the already difficult situation facing country bankers given the recent commencement of 
hostilities with France, a point recognised by the court when it added with emphasis, “Thank 
God few such creditors as the present Plaintiff have been found since the passing of the 
Act!”2  
One way of comprehending the court’s unease in Grigsby v Oakes is to view the decision 
it faced through the lens of what Katharina Pistor has labelled the “law-finance paradox.” 
According to Pistor,  
[l]aw and finance stand in an uneasy, paradoxical relation to one another. Law lends credibility 
to financial instruments by casting the benevolent glow of coercive enforceability over them. 
But the actual enforcement of all legal commitments made in the past irrespective of changes in 
circumstances would inevitably bring down the financial system. If, however, the full force of 
law is relaxed or suspended to take account of such changes, the credibility law lends to finance 
in the first place is undermined.3  
The country banker’s note held by Grigsby was lent credibility by the “benevolent glow of 
coercive enforceability” offered by the court: should the holder of the note wish to enforce 
the banker’s promise to pay in gold coin on demand, the courts would ensure the banker kept 
his promise. Yet in the same moment as the court lent its authority to the note held by 
Grigsby, it also breathed a sigh of relief: thank goodness Grigsby alone was asking for the 
backing of the court. In a world of frequent financial crises, the credibility of country bankers 
and their notes was hard to sustain if too many individuals like Grigsby exercised their formal 
legal right to demand payment in gold coin. Without access to the Bank of England, too many 
such demands – a run on the bank – could leave the banker bankrupt and the note holder with 
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a worthless piece of paper: hence the pejorative name given to bankers outside of London – 
“country rag merchants.”4  
Despite the risk that they might be left holding a mere “country rag,” individuals used 
bankers’ notes of the kind held by Grigsby to such an extent that by the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars there were almost as many country bankers’ notes in circulation as Bank of England 
notes.5 If we are to explain how these notes often survived and prospered in the shadow of 
financial crisis, the law-finance paradox tells us that the legal enforcement of the promise on 
the note may have hindered rather than enhanced the banker’s chances of survival. If legal 
enforcement of the banker’s promise is not enough on its own, how else might we explain the 
credibility of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century country bankers’ notes?  
This article attempts to answer this question by combining insights from two schools of 
thought, the credit approach to money and the relational approach to contract. With respect to 
the former, this article draws on what some scholars in the credit theory tradition have 
labelled the hierarchy of money. Courtesy of this hierarchy we will see that not all promises 
to pay are equally credible. Some debts in the late eighteenth century – such as those of 
country bankers – were more credible than others primarily, I will argue, due to the 
importance of reciprocity. As we will see, country bankers who survived financial crisis were 
supported by reciprocal bonds that tied the note issuing banker to the note using community.  
These reciprocal bonds meant the banker and the community expected to gain something 
in return from trusting each other. When viewed through the lens of the relational contract 
                                                 
4 The phrase was used by William Cobbett, the radical and widely read journalist (as well as farmer, soldier and, 
in the 1830s, Member of Parliament), who at every opportunity attacked paper money. See W. Cobbett, Rural 
Rides … during the years 1821 to 1832, vol. I (1885) 17; and W. Cobbett, Paper Against Gold (1815) 25. Others 
refer to banking as the “rag trade,” see, for example, Anon [W. Reid]., The Life and Adventures of the Old Lady 
of Threadneedle Street (1832) 8. 
5 In 1818, the Bank of England had £26.5 million notes in circulation, the country banks, approximately, £20.5 
million. For information comparing the volume of Bank of England notes with the volume of country bank 
notes, see M. Collins, Money and Banking in the UK: A History (1988) 40; and E. Coppieters, English Banknote 




tradition, we will see that their relationship was not solely defined by the legal enforcement 
of the precise terms contained within the four corners of the country bankers’ note. What also 
shaped their relationship was its on-going nature and immersion in other-than-legal norms 
and community dynamics. This article, then, aims to capture the social embeddedness of, and 
sense of trust running through, the relationship between the note-issuing banker and note-
using community, a relationship which helped bankers to, on occasions, overcome the law-
finance paradox.6   
Yet this reciprocal interplay between banker and community was not just a product of both 
parties trusting each other in the hope that they would then receive mutual gains. As a close 
reading of much of the relational contract tradition shows, trust and law do not necessarily 
stand in opposition to each other.7  Legal enforcement remains relevant – and not only 
because attempts to enforce the promise on the note might lead to the collapse of the banker. 
As this article will argue, legal enforcement also had a more positive role to play in 
facilitating a collective response from the note using community to the plight of its banker 
that sometimes helped bankers and their notes to survive financial crisis and the threat posed 
                                                 
6 On the concept of social embeddedness, see M. Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The 
Problem of Embeddedness’ (1985) 91(3) Am. J. of Sociology 481. 
7 Early empirical scholarship in the broad relational contract tradition highlighted the dissonance between 
assumptions about the role of contract law and actual business practice, see in particular S. Macaulay, ‘Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 Am. Sociology Rev. 55; and H. Beale and T. 
Dugdale, ‘Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies’ (1975) 2(1) Brit. J. 
of Law and Society 45. As Macaulay argued in 1963, “[contractual] planning indicates a lack of trust and blunts 
the demands of friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade,” id., p. 64. Yet this 
research did not find “that legal measures and legally enforceable agreements were of no relevance to the way in 
which business was conducted” (C. Mitchell, Contract Law and Contract Practice: Bridging the Gap between 
Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectation (2013) 69. Emphasis in original). Recent scholarship, including 
by Macaulay himself, has built on this by developing a nuanced analysis of the interplay between legal and non-
legal sanctions. See David Campbell, ‘What Do We Mean by the Non-Use of Contract?’ in J. Braucher, J. 
Kidwell, and W. C. Whitford (eds) Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay (2013) 159; S. 
Deakin, C. Lane, F. Wilkinson, ‘’Trust’ or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of Contractual Relations between 
Firms’ (1994) 21(3) J. of Law and Society 329; and S. Macaulay, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical 
Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules’ (2003) 66(1) Modern Law 
Rev. 44, at 61. For a detailed overview of the relationship between law and trust, see F. B. Cross, ‘Law and 
Trust’ (2005) 93 The Georgetown Law J. 1457. My thoughts on the relationship between social norms and law 
have also been influenced by D. Kennedy, ‘The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!’ (1991) 15(4) Legal 
Studies Forum 327. 
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by the law-finance paradox.8  
This article is structured as follows. It begins by introducing both the credit approach to 
money and the hierarchy of money. It is through a discussion of this hierarchy that I introduce 
the idea of reciprocity. The article then describes in more detail the role played by country 
bankers’ notes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the enforcement by the 
courts of the promise to pay on these notes, and the limits to this enforcement. Although 
haunted by the law-finance paradox, country bankers and their notes could still survive 
moments of financial crisis when reciprocal ties between banker and community came to the 
fore, ties that are easier to see when viewed in light of the insights provided by the relational 
contract tradition. The remainder of the article investigates these reciprocal ties between the 
note issuing banker and the note using community in the context of late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century England. It does so by providing an overview of the service the banker 
performed for his community, before then turning to the favour the community preformed in 
return for the banker, and the interaction between trust and legal enforcement that made such 
community support credible.     
A caveat before we continue. My use of the term “community” in this article implies a 
sense of social solidarity which ignores the class, gender, and imperial conflicts that shaped 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. I bracket these conflicts in this article on the 
assumption that, where communities were able to help their banker, they did so by managing 
or supressing the conflicts running through that community. The details about how 
communities managed, or failed to manage, these conflicts would make for a fascinating 
study, but that is not the study that I undertake here. In this article, I take a degree of social 
                                                 
8 On the role of law in facilitating the collective or group efforts that support the value of money, see R. 
Kreitner, ‘Legal History of Money’ (2012) 8 Annual Rev. of Law and Social Science 415; and C. Desan, ‘The 
Market as a Matter of Money: Denaturalizing Economic Currency in American Constitutional History’ (2005) 
30(1) Law and Social Inquiry 1. 
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solidarity for granted and then explore how this helped to support the notes of country 
bankers.  
 
DEBT-CREDIT RELATIONS AND THE HIERARCHY OF MONEY 
 
When I go to buy a chocolate bar from a corner store, I owe a debt to the owner of the store. 
Imagine that the elaborate monetary institutions of today are absent. How then might I pay 
for the chocolate bar? One option is to write the shopkeeper an IOU or a promissory note of 
my own, promising to perform some service equivalent in value to the chocolate bar at some 
future date. The shopkeeper might then decide to become my creditor by agreeing to hold this 
note representing my debt to her. If people think my promise to make good the debt is 
credible they too might accept the note in payment for a debt owed by the shopkeeper to 
them. The note starts to circulate as a means of payment.  
 The production of such IOUs emphasises the relations between creditors and debtors and 
the promise that binds them, and is frequently referred to as the credit approach to money.9 
Yet this approach comes up against a problem: unless the corner-store owner knows and 
trusts me personally, they run the risk that I will decide not to make good the debt. It is 
difficult for individuals to create a means of payment that circulates widely because it is 
difficult to get other people to agree to hold the debt: how do they know that the debtor will 
make good their debt?  
As part of the credit approach tradition to understanding money, one scholar, Stephanie 
                                                 
9 In this section, I complement insights from the credit approach by drawing on a further approach to 
understanding money, the “state theory” or “Chartalism.” By emphasising the overlap between credit theorists 
and state theorists, this article follows the suggestion of L. R. Wray in his introduction to Credit and State 
Theories of Money: the Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes, ed. L. R. Wray (2004) 1. For examples of the state 
theory tradition, see L. R. Wray, ‘State Money’ (2002) 32(3) International J. of Political Economy 23; and G. F. 
Knapp, The State Theory of Money (1924). For examples of the credit theory tradition, see A. M. Innes, ‘The 
Credit Theory of Money’ (1914) 31 Banking Law J. 151; and G. Ingham, The Nature of Money (2004). For a 
discussion of some of the theories of money from a legal perspective, see C. Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect 
of Money (6th Ed. 2005).  
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Bell, has introduced what she calls the “hierarchy of money,” which we might also call a 
hierarchy of credit and debt.10 All money is a debt that another accepts. But not all debts are 
the same because some debtors are more creditworthy than other debtors. The IOU that I 
write to the shopkeeper for the chocolate bar probably finds its place toward the bottom of the 
hierarchy, though much depends on my actual or perceived wealth. Nobody would accept an 
IOU written by a random stranger on the street, but we treat one written by a large 
corporation quite differently. Between the extremes of the state and a random stranger is a 
vast array of intermediate debt. To simplify as Bell does, we can imagine four tiers to the 
hierarchy moving from least to most credible. On the bottom tier sits the debt of households, 
such as mortgages and credit cards. On the third tier sits the debts of businesses, like 
commercial paper or bills of exchange. And on the second tier sit the liabilities created by 
commercial banks when they make loans. Banks occupy a privileged position in the hierarchy 
owing to their relationship with the issuer of the most credible money in the hierarchy, the 
central bank.11  
It is through the central bank that modern governments issue their own money when they 
buy goods and procure services.12 But why does the money created by the central bank sit at 
the top of the hierarchy of credit and debt? According to scholars like Wray and Bell, people 
and businesses accept this money because of the government’s assurance that it will accept it 
as payment for public obligations such as taxes, fees, and fines.13 Because everyone shares 
these common obligations, businesses and households are constantly in debt to the state and 
so will need a constant stream of the money accepted by the state to cancel their obligations. 
                                                 
10 S. Bell, ‘The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money’ (2001) 25 Cambridge J. of Economics 149. See 
also D. K. Foley, ‘Money in Economic Activity’ in The New Palgrave: Money, eds. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and 
P. Newman (1987) 519. 
11 Bell, id., pp. 158-161. 
12 In the real world, there are significant differences between the government’s finance department and the 
central bank. For the sake of simplicity, however, this article consolidates the treasury and central bank, using 
the phrase “the state” to do so. 




Because households and businesses need the state’s money, they both tend to write up their 
own IOUs in terms of the state’s money (promises to pay accounted for in, say, Pounds 
Sterling). Moreover, when a household or a corporation seeks to pay off a debt, it needs to 
acquire the money that everyone else will accept – the state’s money. By contrast, when the 
government of a state that controls its own currency seeks to pay off a debt, it does not need 
to obtain the money or widely accepted IOUs of any other entity. Instead, that government, 
via its central bank, can create more of its own money, subject to restraints such as a gold 
standard or the threat of higher than acceptable inflation. And, indeed, it is the unlimited 
power of a currency-issuing central bank to create more of that currency that allows states to 
escape from the law-finance paradox: should a state in control of its own currency need to 
honour all of its commitments at the same time, it can do so by creating more of that 
currency.14 
With respect to the state’s money, notice the implicit reciprocal commitments tying 
together state and citizens: the state issues money that citizens accept for goods provided and 
services procured; in return, the state accepts that citizens can use this same money to cancel 
public obligations. This same reciprocity was at work in late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century England.  Gold coins and Bank of England notes sat at the top of the hierarchy of 
credit and debt because of the implicit reciprocal commitments that bound the public 
authorities to the citizens of the polity and made the promises underpinning these forms of 
money highly credible. Citizens accepted payment in the state’s currency, whether coin or 
paper notes, and in return, the state promised to accept gold coins and Bank of England notes 
when citizens fulfilled their public obligations, such as the payment of taxes.15 
                                                 
14  Wray, id., ch. 4. 
15 Currency made credible by ties to the tax system assumes an effective tax system. The system of tax 
collection became increasingly effective during the eighteenth century. See J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: 
War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (1990).  On the role these taxes played in supporting government 
borrowing, made possible by a process historian Peter Dickson describes as the “Financial Revolution,” see P. 
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Yet although these reciprocal commitments made gold coin and Bank of England notes 
valuable that does not mean these forms of currency were always problem free. When it was 
profitable to do so, people melted down and exported gold guinea coins and silver and copper 
coins, coins seldom issued in sufficient quantities in the first place.16 Bank of England notes 
proved inadequate in their own way, for they only circulated in large quantities in and around 
London. Little wonder, then, that contemporaries pejoratively labelled the Bank of England 
the “Bank of London” during the eighteenth century.17 Given these deficiencies in gold coin 
and Bank of England notes, communities across England came to rely on their local country 
banker – or, more typically, small partnership of no more than six bankers18 – to supply them 
with a means of payment.19 Yet the promises to pay issued by country bankers faced 
problems of their own. As we will now explore in detail, the law-finance paradox haunted 
country bankers’ notes: given credibility by the willingness of the courts to enforce the 
promise to pay, that credibility was severely put to the test when too many concurrent 
demands left the banker unable to honour his commitments.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: a study in the development of public credit, 1688-1756 
(1967). 
16 On the coinage, see C. E. Challis, A New History of the Royal Mint (1992) ch. 4 and Feaveryear, op. cit., n. 1, 
chs. VI and VII. 
17 See J. Clapham, The Bank of England: A History (1944) Volume I, 150 and 167. The phrase “Bank of 
London” comes from a pamphlet of 1721, Anon., Proposals for Restoring Credit, for Making the Bank of 
England more useful, etc, etc (1721). Clapham uses the phrase frequently in Volume I of his history of the Bank 
of England, see for example, at pp. 107, 146, 150.  
18 Legislation prohibited “any body politic or corporate whatsoever,” as well as all associations of more than six 
persons in England and Wales, from issuing notes payable on demand. See S. E. Thomas, The Rise and Growth 
of Joint Stock Banking (1934) at 5-16. The relevant legislation is The Bank of England Act 1707 (6 Ann. c. 59) 
[also referred to as 6 Ann. c. 22], Section 9, repeated in The Bank of England Act 1708 (7 Ann. c. 30) [also 
referred to as 7 Ann. c. 7], Section 61. Since country banks could not have more than six partners, estimates 
indicate £10,000 as the average capitalisation of country banks in the first decade of the nineteenth century, see 
Pressnell, op. cit., n. 1, pp. 226-227. 
19 Between 1750 and 1820, coins declined as a percentage of the means of payment while bank notes increased. 
In 1750, precious metals (turned in to coin by the Royal Mint) comprised 37 percent of the means of payment; 
banknotes, 12.5 percent; and bills of exchange, around 50 percent. In 1811, precious metals comprised 7 percent 
of the means of payment; banknotes, 20.9 percent (bank deposits, 7 percent); and bills of exchange, around 65.1 
percent. In 1830, precious metals comprised 18.1 percent of the means of payment; banknotes, 17.4 percent 
(bank deposits, 24.1 percent); and bills of exchange, around 40.4 percent. The figures are from R. Cameron, 
‘England, 1750-1844’ in Banking in the Early Stages of Industrialization, eds. R. Cameron, O. Crisp, H. T. 
Patrick, and R. Tilly (1967) 15, 42.   
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“THE BENEVOLENT GLOW OF COERCIVE ENFORCEABILITY” AND ITS LIMITS 
 
By siding with the note holder in Grigsby v Oakes, the court signalled to communities across 
England using local currencies that they could do so safe in the knowledge that each holder 
could rely on the courts to enforce the bankers promise to pay in gold coin on demand.20 
Moreover, while each banker was a debtor on the notes they issued, they were also a creditor 
owing to the bills of exchange they discounted.21 Like bankers’ notes, bills of exchange were 
backed by a promise to pay, except that the promise in the case of bills was not to pay on 
demand but at some specified date in the future. Fidelity to one’s word was important here: 
bankers and merchants both made promises upon which others depended, promises made 
credible by the “benevolent glow of coercive enforceability” cast over them by the courts. 
Yet, crucially, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century reality frequently made 
fidelity to one’s word challenging. Prices for articles transported long distances over many 
weeks and sometimes months did not tend to hold steady, while war in the eighteenth century 
was never far away.22  
                                                 
20 The courts further helped bank notes to circulate by treating them as interchangeable with state issued coins 
(Miller v. Race (1758) 97 E.R. 398). Only the latter was legal tender, though the courts considered a bank note 
good tender provided the party receiving the note did not object to the note as the form of payment (Wright v. 
Reed (1790) 100 E.R. 729). Promissory notes had been “payable to X or bearer” since the Promissory Notes Act 
1704 (3 & 4 Ann. c. 9). An Act of 1775 (15 Geo. III, c.51) prohibited demand notes of less than £1; a further 
Act in 1777 (17 Geo. III, c.30) extended the prohibition to demand notes under £5. The prohibition on the issue 
of demand notes under £5 was lifted in 1797 (37 Geo. III, c. 32), but was reintroduced in 1816 (56 Geo. III, 
c.21). An Act of 1808 (48 Geo. III, c. 149) required all note-issuing bankers to take out a license. On the history 
of the currency of paper money in England, see D. Fox, ‘Bona Fide Purchase and the Currency of Money’ 
(1996) 55 (3) The Cambridge Law J. 547. On the law of negotiable instruments in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, see J. M. Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (1955); and J. S. Rogers, The 
Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes (1995).  
21 Bankers typically received bills of exchange when the holder wanted to discount the bill. The holder of the 
bill would get money up front in the form of coins, Bank of England notes, or country bankers’ notes. The total 
was, however, less than the face value of the bill because a discount off set the risk that the merchant(s) named 
on the bill might not pay up.  
22 In 1750, it took forty hours to travel the 120 miles between Bristol and London. The growth of turnpike roads 
cut that travelling time down to less than twenty-four hours by 1783 and to less than twelve hours by 1811, see 
B. Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous People: England, 1783-1846 (2006) 23. Between 1680 and 1815, 
England and then Britain fought seven major wars: the Nine Years War (1688-97); the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1702-13); the War of Austrian Succession (1739-48); the Seven Years War (1756-63); the American 
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Since merchants’ plans seldom went without disruption, one consequence was that 
promises made three months prior were often unrealistic come the agreed date of payment. 
Where an acceptor of a bill of exchange failed to pay what was due on the bill, the banker 
who had discounted the bill found he did not have the inflow of cash needed to cover his note 
circulation. A thought then spread throughout the community: if merchants cannot fulfil their 
debts, what about bankers? If the issuing banker failed, the promise on the note to redeem the 
note in gold coin on demand was empty. Those left with the notes held merely a worthless 
piece of paper, hence the use of the phrase “country rag merchants.”23 The failure of a banker 
then became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because the majority of those holding the notes feared 
for the bank’s future, there was a tendency for each note holder to demand payment in gold 
coin at the same time as everyone else – a classic “run on the bank” – creating a strain on the 
banker’s reserve of gold coin that could be too overwhelming a burden to bear.   
Between the late 1780s and 1826 England experienced no less than seven such crises.24 In 
the event of such a crisis, a typical country banker tried to reinforce his position by 
attempting to obtain gold coin and/or Bank of England notes from his agent in London.25 But 
when all other country bankers tried to do the same concurrently – the mark of a crisis – the 
supply of the gold coin and Bank of England notes seldom kept pace with demand. With the 
banker struggling to find the money necessary to fulfil their promises, the note holder might 
attempt to enforce the promise on his note by turning to the courts. Yet bear in mind the law-
                                                                                                                                         
War of Independence (1775-83); the War of the First Coalition (1793-1797); and the Napoleonic Wars (1797-
1815).   
23 Cobbett, op. cit., n. 4.   
24 Country banks were in danger of collapse during moments of crisis in 1788/89, 1793, 1797, 1806, 1810/11, 
1815/16, and 1825/26. See Pressnell, op cit., n. 1, pp. 441-500. See also J. Hoppit, ‘Financial Crisis in 
Eighteenth-Century England’ (1986) 39 (1) The Economic History Rev. 39. 
25 To conduct his business, each country banker kept an account with a London banker that formed their main 
reserve should an economic crisis arise. The London banker used the funds left in this account to invest in 
corporate shares, bills of exchange, and government debt to suit the investment needs of country bankers and the 
country banker’s customers. Alternatively, the London banker used these funds to accept bills drawn by the 
country banker, thereby enabling merchants and early industrialists from across England to access the wealth 




finance paradox: too many concurrent demands on debtors left these debtors unable to honour 
their commitments, while confirmation from the courts that the debtor’s commitment 
remained legally enforceable only added to the debtor’s burden. As unfulfilled contractual 
commitments built up, the average country banker was left only a hair’s breadth from 
bankruptcy, and that is where all too many ended up in first few decades of the nineteenth 
century. Bankruptcy might result in creditors getting a portion of what the banker owed 
them.26 But it came too late to save the country banker’s notes as a means of payment, for 
bankruptcy meant the banker’s credibility was gone and his notes lost their value.  
The extent to which country bankers ended up bankrupt led Leslie Pressnell, the leading 
historian of country banking, to observe that, 
The instability of country banks seems at first sight unmistakable. Between 1750 and 1830 at 
least 343 firms, the members of which described themselves as ‘bankers’, failed in the country; 
334 of them failed between 1790 and 1826, sixty-seven in the three years between 1814-1816, 
and sixty in the period July 1825 to June 1826.27   
To further contextualise these figures, 18 bankers failed in 1792-93 out of a total of 280; 67 
bankers failed between 1814 and 1816 out of a total in 1814 of 733.28 A failure rate of 6-9 
percent is high, but it also indicates that many more bankers survived than succumbed to 
financial crisis. Why then were some bankers able to sustain their promises to pay?  
As we saw earlier, all money is a debt, but not all debts are the same because some debtors 
are more creditworthy than others. Between the money issued by the state and the IOUs of a 
random stranger sit a vast array of intermediate debts. In Stephanie Bell’s four tier model, 
banks sit on the tier immediately below the state’s money because of their close ties to the 
                                                 
26 On the bankruptcy regime of the time see J. Hoppit, Risk and Failure in English Business in the Eighteenth 
Century (1987). 
27 Pressnell, op. cit., n. 1, p. 443. 
28 Id. The figures on the number of country banks each year between 1784 and 1842 are on p. 11. The figures on 




central bank. Today, owing to these close ties the IOUs of banks are interchangeable with the 
currency issued by the state.29 Crucially, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
the ties between country bankers and the Bank of England were often strained, especially so 
during moments of financial crisis when country bankers most needed the assistance of the 
Bank of England. During such moments the Bank of England was often accused of not doing 
enough to ease the strain on hard-pressed merchants and bankers. Consider the following 
view of the Bank of England as expressed by one contemporary in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 1793:  
Trustees of a great trading company, instituted not less for the public good than for private 
emolument, it might have been expected that they [the Bank of England’s directors] would step 
into the breach, and have given the weak and wounded individual time to escape … Instead … 
the directors pusillanimously led the way in the general discomfiture, or were active only in 
enriching themselves from the spoils of those who had fallen in the struggle.30 
An explanation of the reluctance of the Bank of England to assume responsibility “for the 
public good” during this period is outside the scope of this article. The aim of this article is, 
instead, to consider the resilience of many country bankers and their notes notwithstanding 
the reluctance of the Bank of England to fully embrace the role of what we today call a 
central bank. Part of what helps to explain this resilience is that, even in the absence of close 
ties to the Bank of England, the promises of country bankers did not sit on the same tier of 
the hierarchy of money as the promises of a random stranger. The relationship between 
Grigsby and the bank in Bury St Edmunds may appear at first sight as a one-off exchange 
between strangers, amounting to little more than the presentation of a note in exchange for 
gold coin. And the role of law in these relations may appear initially to amount to little more 
than the documentation of the terms of the contract between the note-issuing banker and the 
                                                 
29 On the ties between the Central Bank and commercial banks, see Wray, op. cit., n. 13, ch. 3.  
30 [Roscoe], Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Failures (1793), 20, quoted in F. Fetter, Development of 
British Monetary Orthodoxy (1965) 14.  
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note-using public as detailed on the note itself, such as the name of the party issuing the note, 
the amount due in exchange for the note, and the fact that the note was payable on demand to 
bearer. It was exactly these explicit terms that the court in Grigsby v Oakes focused on when 
it confirmed that the promise to pay was legally enforceable. And by concentrating on these 
terms, the court did in fact treat Grigsby and Oakes & Co. as strangers to a one-off 
transaction: all going well, when the holder cashed the note the transaction was complete and 
the relationship between the parties over. But there was more to both the transaction and the 
role of law than this.  
It is at this juncture that the relational approach to contract becomes helpful. In keeping 
with the insights of this approach, “the common type of commercial exchange” is one found 
“among participants in continuing relations, members of interactive communities whose 
projects themselves, as well as expectations about how they will be carried out, are partially 
created by community.”31 The creation of country bankers’ notes was a “common type of 
commercial exchange” in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century that emerged from 
“continuing relations” between “members of interactive communities.” This community 
embeddedness made the IOUs of country bankers qualitatively different from the IOUs 
created by a random stranger. The IOUs of the random stranger sit on the bottom tier of the 
hierarchy of money because no one will accept them; there is an absence of reciprocity. By 
contrast, a reciprocal interplay supports the credit of the state on the top tier. As we have 
seen, citizens accept the state’s money, and in return the state promises to accept this money 
back again when citizens fulfill their public obligations. A similar movement underpinned 
country bankers’ notes: the banker supplied the community with a means of payment and, in 
return, the community lent their backing to the banker during times of crisis. It was this 
reciprocity between the note issuing banker and the note using community that sustained 
                                                 
31 R. W. Gordon, ‘Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law’ (1985) 




demand for the banker’s notes and allowed these notes to sit in the top half of the hierarchy of 
credit and debt. Our task now is to detail this reciprocal relationship between the note issuing 
banker and the note using community.32   
The next section explores the service the banker performed for the community. Thereafter, 
this article turns to the community’s response. In the circumstances of a financial crisis a 
choice confronted the note using community. Each member could “stand on their rights” and 
demand fulfilment of the promise in accordance with the strict terms of the contract as 
written on the note. By so doing, some would perhaps get gold coin, but most would not and 
the banker would likely end up bankrupt. The alternative choice was for the community to 
lend its collective backing to the banker, to “lend … mutual support, rather than [stand] on 
[its] rights.”33 This mutual support took three different forms, each of which sought to sustain 
demand for the notes. The first and most common was a collective act of forbearance by 
which members of the community publicly declaring their faith in the banker and willingness 
to forgo their right to cash in the note. The other two forms of support were bolder still since 
they pushed beyond trust without legal backing and instead used legally binding 
commitments as a means of formalising the trust that underpinned the reciprocity between 
banker and community.  
 
THE BANKER’S SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY 
 
Until the second half of the eighteenth century, a prominent local shopkeeper, merchant, or 
                                                 
32 An additional factor that helped to add credibility to country bankers’ notes follows from the ties that often 
existed between the note issuing banker and the system of tax collection and remittance. In situations where the 
note holder could use the country banker’s promise to pay to cancel tax obligations, a current of demand 
supported the banker’s notes. On the connections between country bankers and the system of tax collection in 
the early nineteenth century, see L. S. Pressnell, ‘Public Monies and the Development of English Banking’, 
(1953) 5(3) Economic History Rev. 378.   




manufacturer performed the banking function in towns and villages across England.34 
Shopkeepers, in particular, morphed into bankers in the second half of the eighteenth century 
owing to a combination of their central position within the networks of local creditors and 
debtors, and their close links to commercial centres like London. By performing this function, 
the early banker “began to subsume the credit which had been a part of the innumerable small 
transactions in the early modern period.”35 Through the extension of his own credit, the 
banker’s IOU replaced the personal trust tying together the credit relations between, for 
example, a farmer and an innkeeper. Instead of the farmer accepting the IOU of the 
innkeeper, or vice versa, both parties came to use the impersonal credit of a third party, the 
country banker.36  
Being at the centre of the “credit ‘nexus’ of the local community”37 meant the banker held 
accounts for a cross section of that local community. In Nottingham, for example, the key 
local trades were knitting and hosiery. Consequently the town’s banker, Smiths, held the 
accounts of those who supported this trade, including framesmiths, stocking-needle makers, 
threadmen, woolcombers, and dyers, not to mention the larger merchants like linen and 
woolen drapers, mercers, and clothiers. Owing to the success of the knitting and hosiery 
sectors, other trades and crafts flourished too, as evidenced by the accounts Smiths held for a 
wide cross sections of local businesses.38  
                                                 
34 See T. S. Ashton, An Eighteenth Century Industrialist: Peter Stubs of Warrington, 1756-1806 (1936)105, and 
T. S. Willan, An Eighteenth-Century Shopkeeper: Abraham Dent of Kirkby Stephen (1970) ch. VII. The 
shopkeeper in the account offered by Willan, Abraham Dent, began to deal in bills of exchange but not to the 
extent that would allow him to become a banker. As Willan notes, “As Dent’s trade in commodities declined, his 
dealings in bills rose. Perhaps he was moving tentatively along that road which, in other cases, turned the 
shopkeeper and merchant into the banker. But he hardly achieved that metamorphosis” (127). On the emergence 
of bankers out of shopkeepers, see H. Thornton,  An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of 
Great Britain (1801) 156-8; Rogers, op. cit., 20, p.110; and Feaveryear, op. cit., n. 1, pp.162-164. 
35 C. Muldrew, ‘Interpreting the market: the ethics of credit and community relations in early modern England’ 
(1993) 18(2) Social History 163, 182. 
36 See Pressnell, op. cit., n. 1, p. 138. On the triangular relations between the two parties using the money and 
the issuer of the money, see G. Ingham, ‘Revisiting the credit theory of money and trust’ in J. Pixley (ed.) New 
Perspectives on Emotions in Finance: The sociology of confidence, fear and betrayal (2012) 121 at 128-129.  
37 B. A. Holderness, ‘Credit in a Rural Economy, 1660-1800’ (1975) 3(2) Midland History 94, 106. 
38 J. A. S. L. Leighton-Smith, Smiths the Bankers, 1658-1958 (1958) 38-9. This pattern, where one prominent 
and unique local trade sustained commonplace trades, repeats in towns across England and Wales. On Hull, see 
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The town’s banker brought all of these trades and crafts together. In so doing, the banker 
provided services that matched the status of his customers. Some customers had a net credit 
balance. Such customers, typically a town or region’s local landowning gentry and its 
principal traders and manufacturers, looked to their local banker as an outlet for their 
investments. Through his agent in London, the country banker directed these investments 
towards government debt or other securities.39 The country banker also offered an investment 
himself, by providing those who left a credit balance with interest payments. The Kendal 
Bank, in Westmorland, north Lancashire, for example, allowed 4 percent interest where “our 
friends lodge money with us for a year certain.”40  
The Kendal Bank’s “friends” were those customers it considered “gentlemen,” including 
the gentry and those wealthy enough to leave a credit balance untouched for months at a time. 
Bankers distinguished “Gentlemen” from “tradesmen,” as the accounts of the latter tended to 
fluctuate over the course of a year, sometimes in credit, with the banker paying them interest, 
other times in debit, with the client paying interest to the banker. Tradesmen and craftsmen, 
such as saddlers, millers, maltsters, cornfactors, bakers, butchers, grocers, and so on, sent 
bills they received in payment to their bankers and drew on the bankers to make payments 
they owed to others. As Ashton describes the relationship,  
Instead of keeping his own portfolio of bills, a trader could send those he received direct to his 
banker, who would discount them for him and set the balance to his credit. Instead of himself 
taking or sending a bill for acceptance or payment, he could leave this troublesome business to 
a banker.41   
In manufacturing centres country banks further aided traders, craftsmen, and emerging 
                                                                                                                                         
Leighton-Smith at p. 199 and p. 215. On Derby, see Leighton-Smith at pp. 257-8.  
39 See op. cit. n. 25. 
40 G. Chandler, Four Centuries of Banking, vol. 1 (1964) 60. 
41 T. S. Ashton, An Eighteenth Century Industrialist: Peter Stubs of Warrington, 1756-1806 (1936) 112. 
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industrialists by providing them with a means of paying wages.42 In agricultural regions, 
country bankers played a key role in facilitating the payment of rent by tenants to landlords 
and often channeled seasonal assistance to farmers.43 So central was the banker to the 
endeavours of the community of which he was a member that one contemporary remarked, 
In the present relations of society it [Banking] not only affects us one and all, more or less 
directly, but is so potent and penetrating that there is no escaping from its influence, or getting 
on without direct and intimate connexion with it … What is there … that a man can begin 
without a Bank; and what, however well begun or conducted, that will not, when the Bank 
refuses accommodation, at once stop, sink, and be for ever extinguished?44 
I want to use these examples to emphasise the central role that bankers played in their 
local community. The banker provided the link between the different levels of social 
hierarchy. And that meant the banker tied together with each other gentry and landlords, 
prestigious merchants and professionals, “middling and small manufacturers,” tradesman and 
craftsmen (“bricklayers, carpenters, butchers, butter and bacon dealers, shoemakers, cattle-
jobbers”),45 farmers, and wage labourers. Without the role played by their banker, the 
cohesion of the local community suffered. Yet, as this article now explores, while the 
community needed their banker, the relationship was reciprocal because the banker could not 
prosper long without the backing of his local community. 
 
THE COMMUNITIES SERVICE TO ITS BANKER 
 
                                                 
42 See Pressnell, op. cit., n. 1, pp. 153-6. For an example of a manufacturer issuing his own paper currency, see 
G. Urwin, Samuel Oldknow and the Arkrights: The Industrial Revolution at Stockport and Marple (1967) 176.  
43 The best example is Vincent Stuckey’s bank in Somersetshire, see Stuckey to Committee on Renewing the 
Bank of England Charter, British Parliamentary Papers (1831-32) (722) VI. 
44 The passage was written by Richard Page in the 1840s though it is equally applicable to this earlier phase of 
banking, [Richard Page], Banks and Bankers (2nd Ed. 1843) 1-2.  
45 D. Robinson, ‘The Country Banks and the Bank of England’ (Dec. 1827) 22 Blackwood’s Edinburgh 




Bankers needed the support of their local note using community more than ever during 
moments of financial crisis. At such moments, bankers bore the brunt of the crisis given their 
place at the centre of local and inter-regional credit arrangements. Following the general 
collapse in confidence, the credibility of the promise to pay on each bill of exchange was in 
doubt. To cover debts owed, creditors needed an asset on which they could rely, preferably 
gold coin and/or Bank of England notes since these had state backing and sat towards the top 
of the hierarchy of money. One obtained these forms of money by demanding the fulfilment 
of the promise requiring the issuer of the note to pay in gold coin on demand, or by 
withdrawing funds deposited with a banker. Either way the banker faced a demand from his 
creditors for state backed forms of currency at precisely the moment when the banker’s in 
flow of money from his debtors, those who owed money on the bills of exchange he had 
discounted, was drying up. The suggestion that the banker was unable to fulfil the legally 
enforceable obligations he owed to note holders and depositors only reinforced the crisis by 
unnerving the bank’s remaining note holders and depositors, potentially setting off a run on 
the bank.  
A run on the bank benefited no one. Since the banker’s promise was legally enforceable, 
some note holders – if they were quick enough – might get gold coin or Bank of England 
notes. Yet even those who converted the country banker’s notes into gold coin before the 
banker ran out of gold coin would lose out owing to the collapse of the local currency. 
Without a medium of exchange, the community as a whole suffered, including people like 
Grigsby. Note using communities had to avoid that outcome if possible. Avoiding that 
outcome required grappling with, and finding a way of managing, the law-finance paradox. 
As we will now explore, many communities were successful in their efforts. Although a 
banker’s promises to pay were legally enforceable, there was no rule that said either (i) that 
the note holder had to enforce the promise, or (ii) that some other party could not assume the 
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banker’s responsibilities.   
The most common type of support offered by communities to their banker followed from 
option (i) and took the form of a collective act of forbearance by which members of the 
community publicly declared their faith in the banker and willingness to forgo their right to 
cash in the note. Although the promise on the note remained legally enforceable, the note 
holder placed that legal entitlement on hold by choosing to ignore the terms contained 
between the four corners of the note. The effect of this type of support was to ease the 
pressure on the banker.  
Consider these examples from the 1790s. In 1793 the strain experienced by the bankers of 
Newcastle resulted in a public meeting in April that led to the following declaration of 
support from local citizens for the town’s banks: “Resolved unanimously:—That we in our 
several Capacities will, as usual, accept in payment the Notes issued by any of the above-
mentioned Banks, and will do our utmost Endeavours to induce others to do the Same.”46 
Similar declarations can be found in the same year in Liverpool, where the city’s merchants 
sought to re-enforce the promises buttressing each bill of exchange.47 They did so by 
declaring their support for the city’s banks via public notice, stating that, “we ... do mutually 
pledge ourselves to each other, and to the public, that we are ready and willing to receive in 
payment the bills of the several Banking Houses of this town … at One or Two months’ date, 
as hath been the usual and customary practice.”48 Shortly after this first public declaration, in 
                                                 
46 Maberly Phillips, A History of Banks, Bankers and Banking in Northumberland, Durham and North Yorkshire  
(1894) 48. 
47 In Lancashire bills of exchange comprised the local currency during the latter period of the eighteenth century 
and first quarter of the nineteenth. When they discounted a large bill of, say, £2,000, Lancashire bankers 
encouraged the circulation of bills of exchange as currency by reissuing smaller bills they had previously 
discounted as an alternative to issuing notes payable on demand, see T. S. Ashton, ‘The Bill of Exchange and 
Private Banks in Lancashire, 1780-1830’ in Papers in English Monetary History, eds. T. S. Ashton and R. S. 
Sayers (1953) 37; and P. L. Cottrell and Lucy Newton, ‘Banking Liberalization in England and Wales’ in The 
State, the Financial System and Economic Modernization, eds. Richard Sylla, Richard Tilly and Gabriel Tortella 
(1999) 75, at 105.  
48 223 merchants and firms signed the notice. The public notice, issued on 20 March 1793, is reproduced in J. 
Hughes, Liverpool Banks and Bankers (1906) 147-8.  
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a further public announcement the committee appointed by the Liverpool Corporation to 
consider courses of action for the city declared that they,  
taking into consideration the difficulties that may arise in providing for the bills which may be 
returned in the present critical state of credit, DO MOST EARNESTLY RECOMMEND to the 
holders of such bills … to make the payments as easy to the parties who may be called upon as 
shall be consistent with prudence to themselves: And, as in many cases, Forbearance may be a 
wise measure for the interest of the public in general, and for the bill holders in particular, this 
Committee recommend as much indulgence as the exigency of the times and their own 
discretion will admit, and as may be prudent and eligible, in every point of view.49  
Further examples can be found later in the decade. In 1797, owing to the commencement 
of hostilities with France, parliament suspended the obligation requiring the Bank of England 
to convert its notes into gold coin on demand.50 It was in this context that Grigsby demanded 
payment in gold coin in return for the country banker’s note. Not all creditors behaved like 
Grigsby, however. In the Midlands, at Banbury, a meeting in the town hall led to declarations 
of support not only for the local banks, but also for the Bank of England, with the town 
inhabitants asked to “take in payment from both banking houses in Banbury not only the 
notes of the Bank of England but also the notes of both banking houses; the general concern 
of the said houses being in situations of the greatest respectability.”51 While in the southwest, 
the Mayor of Bristol called a meeting attended by seventy leading citizens, including the 
most prominent bankers, where it was resolved unanimously that,  
In order to prevent any inconvenience that may result to the community, and to preserve public 
confidence in this emergency, we will accept, and we earnestly recommend our fellow citizens 
to take payment in, the promissory notes of the several Bankers in the city in lieu of cash: and 
                                                 
49 id., p. 149. Hughes reproduces this later announcement (pp. 148-9), made on 25 March 1793. Emphasis in 
original.  
50 See summary at op. cit. n. 1.    




we recommend to the several Bankers that they do not make any payments in specie, or 
demand specie for any bills in their hands from any person who shall tender Bristol or Bank of 
England notes to the amount of such bills: and this resolution shall be in force until the sense of 
parliament on the subject shall be known.52 
Through these responses, the communities of Newcastle, Liverpool, Banbury, and Bristol 
made a public commitment to their bankers comprised of two parts: first, they would forgo 
their formal legal right and not demand conversion of the note into gold coin; and, second, 
they publicly declared their willingness to continue to accept the banker’s notes in fulfilment 
of debts others owed to them. Such acts of forbearance were common during all financial 
crises during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.53 And courtesy of such 
declarations, communities found a way of managing the law–finance paradox: after all, there 
is only a paradox if the banker faces too many simultaneous demands to honour legally 
enforceable promises. 
 
                                                 
52 C. H. Cave, The History of Banking in Bristol, 1750-1899 (1899) 18. 
53 References to this phenomenon in contemporary pamphlets include Anon., A Letter to Peel on the Issues of 
Country Bankers (1819) 13-14; T. Joplin, An Essay on the General Principles and Present Practice of Banking 
(1827) 3-4; and A. H. Holdsworth, A Letter to a Friend in Devonshire on the Importance of Country Bankers 
(1818) 7-8, 17.  
Instances of community support for their bank during the crisis of, for example, 1825 include those 
documented in The Times, 15 Dec 1825 and 16 Dec 1825 (covering declaration of support from across England 
and Wales); The Bristol Mercury, 19 Dec 1825 and 26 Dec 1825; The Derby Mercury, 21 Dec 1825; The Leeds 
Mercury, 24 Dec 1825, 21 Jan 1826, 28 Jan 1826, 4 Feb 1826, and 4 March 1826; and The Morning Post, 19 
Dec 1825 and 20 Dec 1825 (like The Times, the declarations are from across the country). As London 
newspapers, The Times and the Morning Post carried declarations from across the country. Almost all country 
bankers’ notes were payable in London as well as at the bank that originally issued the note (the banker’s agent 
in London taking responsibility for payment in London). During a crisis, declarations of support aimed to 
reassure all of the bank’s note holders, locally and elsewhere. To reassure local note holders, the declaration 
appeared in the local papers. To reassure note holders elsewhere, the London press also carried the declaration.    
Other references to the phenomenon can be found in the following sources: Pressnell, op. cit., n. 1, pp. 459, 
461, 467, 484; A. C. E. Jones, ‘Early Banks in Ipswich’ (Sept., 1951) Notes and Queries 402, at 405; H. Ling 
Roth, The Genesis of Banking in Halifax (1914) 5; P. Hudson, ‘The Regional Perspective’ in Regions and 
Industries: A Perspective on the Industrial Revolution in Britain, ed., P. Hudson (1989) 382; J. Ryton, Banks and 
Banknotes of Exeter, 1769-1906 (1984) 69-70; Matthews and Tuke, op. cit., n. 51, pp. 200-201; A.G.E. Jones, 
‘The Banks of Bath’ (July, 1958) Notes and Queries 277, at 281; and P. R. Jenkins, A History of Banking in 
Sussex (1987) 32-5 and 40. 
 
    
23 
 
Yet these declarations of public support only worked in the long-term provided the note 
holder could forgo payment of their own debts too, a point illustrated by the declaration of 
support offered by Liverpool’s merchants. That declaration encouraged everyone due 
payment on a bill of exchange to try to support the promise to pay written on the bill, and 
suggested “making payments easy” and showing “indulgence” as two methods of easing the 
strain on hard pressed debtors, as least in the short term. Yet such short-term forms of support 
had their limits, a reality that John Coleman, a Liverpool bread and biscuit maker, knew only 
too well. Coleman described his situation in 1793 in the following terms,  
[O]ne of my principal debtor’s stopped payment, owing me a sum of nearly two thousand 
pounds and some others owing me large sums, but could not or would not pay any money on 
account of the lost confidence … not a house of any note or consequence in town but what was 
either fail’d, or reported must soon stop payment – all business at a stand, the three Banks shut 
up, every morning bringing with it a declaration of new bankruptcies … Such scenes of alarm 
and distress was never before experienced in any town or city (most probably) in the world… I 
was one of the unfortunate number in the list of bankruptcies.54 
As those behind the Liverpool declaration were aware, a party due payment on a bill could 
only rework the terms of payment with those who owed them money to an amount 
“consistent with prudence to themselves.” The problem facing someone like John Coleman in 
1793 was that each creditor was a debtor to others, and those to whom they owed money had 
to be willing to renegotiate the terms of payment. During the spring of 1793, few had faith in 
the capacity of others to pay what they owed at any point in the near future, and that made it 
difficult to convince widely dispersed and now risk-averse creditors to place the repayment of 
debts on hold. Consider the fate of John Coleman: those who owed him money were unable 
to fulfil their obligations, leaving Coleman without the money to meet his own debts. 
                                                 




Coleman may have been more than willing to indulge his debtors, but the fact remains that he 
ended up bankrupt.55 
Collective acts of forbearance faced an additional problem. All that the meetings in 
Newcastle, Banbury, Bristol, and Liverpool could do was “recommend” that note holders 
continue to accept the notes of the city’s bankers “in lieu of cash.” The decision about 
whether or not to follow the recommendation lay with each note holder. These public 
meetings did not have the legal authority to change that fact and, hence, could not compel a 
creditor like Grigsby to give up his formal right that obliged the banker to convert the note 
into cash. Weight was added to the recommendation when a large number of prominent local 
citizens added their backing to the declaration and its recommendation. But even so, there 
was no means of compelling these citizens to honour their word: these were statements of 
intention not legally binding commitments.   
An alternative solution was to turn statements of intention into legally binding 
commitments, and that’s what happened in Newcastle and Liverpool in 1793 – though, as we 
will see, both solutions were made possible by quite different legal mechanisms. Let us 
consider Newcastle first. There, the same public meeting that produced the public declaration 
of support for the city’s bankers also led to the appointment by the city of a committee set 
with the task of exploring additional options open to the town and region. The committee’s 
report56 on how to support the credit of Newcastle’s bankers reflected in its proposals the 
need for a longer-term solution.  
… we suggest the propriety of all, who are any way connected with the landed or Commercial 
interests of this town, and the adjoining counties, entering into a guarantee for the space of 
twelve months, securing to the holders of the notes of these Banks, the full sums due upon 
them. It is our idea that every gentleman should name the sum for which he will be answerable, 
                                                 
55 The final straw came for John Coleman when his banker, Heywood’s, refused to extend his overdraft. See 
Chandler, op. cit., n. 40, p. 190. 
56 Phillips, op. cit., n. 46, pp. 50-51 where Phillips reproduces the report. 
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and that proper persons should be authorised to call for the sums subscribed, or any part of 
them, if ever they should be necessary to aid the funds of the Banks …57  
The report concluded with the signatures of 148 local gentlemen and merchants, who each 
added a figure after their name. The figure was the sum each person signing the declaration 
was willing to contribute to the guarantee fund. The sums varied from £500 to £20,000. The 
total raised was £320,000, £90,000 more than the city needed to cover the note issue of its 
four banks.58 By late April, the committee reported that the guarantee fund had risen to 
£490,600.59 Courtesy of this fund, the promise on each note remained payable in gold coin 
because the wealth of a section of the community underwrote the commitments of the city’s 
bankers.60 
In Liverpool, the alternative to public declarations of support for the city’s bankers was 
even bolder. With the prospect of a Bank of England loan dead in the water, the Mayor of 
Liverpool petitioned parliament for an act authorising the Liverpool Corporation to issue 
negotiable notes up to a fixed amount. The Liverpool Note Issue Act61 passed with speed, 
perhaps indicating the influence held by Liverpool’s commercial elite at the time,62 and gave 
the Corporation permission to issue paper currency up to a limit of £300,000.63   
The idea was that merchants and bankers, presently unable to discount or receive payment 
for bills and/or goods in their possession could use these bills and goods as security to obtain 
                                                 
57 id., p. 51. 
58 id., pp. 51-2. 
59 id., pp. 52-4. 
60 Underwriting the debts of the town’s bankers placed those contributing to the guarantee fund at risk of 
personal financial ruin, a point observed by at least one contemporary, the timber merchant and monetary 
theorists Thomas Joplin, who, reflecting on a similar pledge of support in 1816, noted: “It is not unusual for the 
friends of a Bank so situated, to issue out Bills or Notices, pleading themselves to the public, to take its Notes in 
payment, to any amount. By this measure, should the Bank happen to stop, many of them would necessarily be 
ruined.” See Joplin op. cit., n. 53, pp. 3-4.    
61 The Liverpool Note Issue Act 1793 (33 Geo. III c. 31). 
62 E. C. K. Gonner, ‘Municipal Bank Notes in Liverpool, 1793-5’ (1896) 6 Economic J. 484, at 485. On 
Liverpool politics during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see F. E. Sanderson, ‘The Structure of 
Politics in Liverpool, 1780-1807’ (1978) 127 Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire 
65.  
63 The description of how the Corporation’s note issue worked draws on F. E. Hyde, B. B. Parkinson, and S. 
Marriner, ‘The Port of Liverpool and the Crisis of 1793’ (1951) 18 Economica 363, at 369-70. 
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a loan from the Corporation.64 The Corporation would make the loan by issuing its own paper 
currency either in £100 and £50 notes bearing interest, or in smaller denominations of £10 
and £5 not bearing interest.65 The hope was that these notes might then circulate, and in the 
process provide a means of fulfilling debts. The key to the appeal of the notes was that at set 
dates in the future the holder could present them to the Corporation to be redeemed for their 
value in legal tender currency. By the time the note holder could redeem the note, the 
Corporation anticipated that those who had borrowed the notes in the first place would have 
re-paid their debt in legal tender coins. Assuming the repayment of these debts, the 
Corporation would have the funds available to redeem the notes without suffering any loss. If 
those who had borrowed failed to repay the loan, and if the security offered, in many 
instances bills of exchange, turned out to be worthless, the notes could still be redeemed 
using the Corporation’s tax income. It was this guarantee that made the notes a valuable 




At first glance it may seem surprising that the responses to the law-finance paradox 
documented here involved the creation of additional legal obligations. After all, the problem 
identified by the law-finance paradox is that financial commitments made credible by legal 
enforcement can be rendered worthless when large numbers of creditors try to enforce these 
commitments regardless of changed circumstances. The essence of the paradox is that law 
                                                 
64 The Act tasked a Loan Office with determining who was eligible for assistance. A separate committee saw to 
the day-to-day business of the note issue. Adequate security included 2/3 of the value of goods, wares, and 
merchandise. The Loan Office might also consider bills of exchange of no longer than nine months until 
maturity. The Act, however, placed restrictions on the use of real estate as security. In addition, no one was to 
receive a loan of more than £3,000.  
65 Interest bearing notes were redeemable 12 months after issue and bore a rate of interest of 5 percent (the legal 
maximum in 1793) or less. Redemption of non-interest bearing notes was only possible three years after issue.   
66 Hughes, op. cit., n. 48, pp. 152-3 reproduces an overview of the revenues of the Liverpool Corporation in 




offers credibility that it cannot fulfil, at least not when needed most by creditors. Yet because 
finance is hierarchical, not all promises rank the same. The incentives to accept the state’s 
money are strong, while they are weak with respect to an IOU offered by a random stranger. 
The task of this article has been to identify why, in the absence of support from the Bank of 
England, country bankers’ notes sat high enough up the hierarchy of money to sometimes 
survive moments of financial crisis. The answer is that the notes of bankers who survived 
crises were supported by reciprocal bonds that tied the note issuing banker to the note using 
community – bonds that were, on occasions, made all the stronger by legal enforceability. 
Sometimes these bonds were not strong enough to prevent the failure of the banker. 
Country bankers failed in part because of the law-finance paradox and in part because 
relational contracts are immersed in relations of power and domination as well as in relations 
which promote solidarity.67 Class, gender, and empire all shaped the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century; my sense is that further research might well reveal a role for all three 
during moments when country bankers collapsed. Yet those moments where bankruptcy 
replaced reciprocity have not been the focus of this article. Instead, this article has focused on 
those bankers who survived crisis. 
Bankers survived in part through the support they received from the community to which 
they belonged. Although the three forms of community support considered in this paper 
differed in their specifics, they were united by a willingness on the part of a community to 
assume responsibilities on behalf of beleaguered bankers. Public declarations of support from 
the note using community saw these note holders publicly declare their faith in the town’s 
banks and willingness to continue to accept the bankers’ notes. By so doing, they assumed the 
risk that the note might still end up as worthless as a “country rag.” The problem was that not 
all note holders found it “consistent with prudence to themselves” to assume such risk. What 
                                                 
67 Gordon, op. cit., n. 31, pp. 570-571. 
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they needed was a form of community support that afforded a stronger guarantee that the 
banks would eventually honour their commitments.   
The initiatives in Newcastle and Liverpool managed the risk of the banks collapsing by 
using a deeper pool of wealth to provide that stronger guarantee. Part of what makes the 
state’s money valuable is that it is desired by all who must honour public obligations. There 
follows a strong current of demand that helps to keep the state’s money lodged firmly on the 
top tier of the hierarchy of credit and debt. The initiatives in Newcastle and Liverpool 
succeeded because these communities found ways of creating demand for local forms of 
currency just as the state created demand for gold coin and Bank of England notes. In 
Newcastle, people were less willing to reject the notes once they knew that payment of the 
promise on the note was legally guaranteed not just by the banker, but by all who had 
indemnified the note holder against loss. These guarantees then stabilized demand for the 
notes. In Liverpool, the notes of the Corporation were even more desirable because they were 
guaranteed by the city itself. Echoing events in Newcastle, the guarantee of the Liverpool 
Corporation helped to stabilize demand for its notes. The difference between the initiatives in 
Newcastle and Liverpool was their size: in Newcastle, prominent citizens indemnified the 
notes of the town’s bankers, while in Liverpool the guarantee fund consisted of the city’s 
entire tax intake.  
Despite its contribution to the law-finance paradox, legal enforceability played a key role 
in buttressing this demand. Legally enforceable commitments only pose a problem for the 
debtor in a scenario where the debtor faces demands for payment far greater than they have 
the resources to meet. The communities of Newcastle and Liverpool managed this problem 
during the financial crisis of 1793 by ensuring that the debtor – in this case their town’s 
bankers – had the requisite resources. They did so by making commitments to which the law 
lend credibility by casting over them “the benevolent glow of coercive enforceability.” These 
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commitments turned the promises of the local bankers into secured transactions: should the 
banker fail to keep his promise, the injured party could claim some other asset of equivalent 
value – such as the indemnity provided by a guarantor or the security offered by tax 
revenue.68 Provided the community’s security matched the value of the banker’s note issue, 
together community and banker could manage the law-finance paradox.  
That they sometimes did so successfully tells us something about the relationship between 
law and trust. Just as the law-finance paradox exposes the often uneasy relationship between 
law and finance, the relational approach to contract exposes the similarly uneasy relationship 
between legally enforceable obligations and the interpersonal trust necessary in successful 
business relationships. And, indeed, managing the law-finance paradox at first glance appears 
to involve replacing law with trust since the paradox highlights the limits of legally 
enforceable obligations. The responses in Newcastle and Liverpool overcame these limits 
because they allowed law and trust to complement each other rather than stand in opposition, 
and did so by using the promises of guarantors and local government “as a way of 
formalising trust, or as a form of institutionalised trust.”69  
By institutionalising trust, communities formalised the reciprocal tie that bound banker 
and community together. While the community’s banker provided that community with a 
means of payment, during times of crisis the community returned the favour by pooling 
resources and covering the banker’s obligations – sometimes via acts of forbearance, at other 
times by indemnifying the banker’s notes, and occasionally through guarantees supported by 
tax revenues. By so doing, these communities orchestrated collective responses to crisis that 
allowed courts such as the one in Grigsby v Oakes to breathe a sigh of relief: rather than 
standing on their rights and demanding payment, note holders stood together as a community 
                                                 
68 See Macaulay, op. cit., n. 7, ‘The Real and the Paper Deal’, p. 61, where he suggests “Secured transactions are 
where I think effective law matters most.” See also Campbell, op. cit., n. 7, p. 169.  
69 Mitchell, op. cit., n. 7, p. 93. 
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and in the process allowed the notes of their bankers to survive financial crises.   
